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Virtue and law in Plato 
Julia Annas 
In both the Republic and the Laws, Plato delineates societies whose aim is 
the happiness of the citizens;' and in both works they are to achieve happi-
ness by living a life of virtue. It is the chief aim of Magnesia, the city of the 
Laws — one it shares with the Doric societies of Sparta and Crete, though 
with an enlarged and improved view of it — to make the citizens happy by 
rendering them virtuous.2 
In the Laws we do not find an account of virtue as the harmony of the 
soul's parts, as we do in the Republic, but this does not indicate that Plato 
has narrowed or impoverished his view of virtue as the good condition of 
the person's character. Virtue is not merely a matter of reliably doing the 
right thing, but requires that the person do it in the right way, with the 
right understanding and with the right feelings. So much is clear from 
the important programme of education, which is to train the citizens of 
Magnesia not just to do the right things but to enjoy this, to find a life of 
virtue pleasant and a life of vice repulsive. 
There is one obvious change: in Magnesia the citizens are to become 
virtuous by growing up and living in a society explicitly regulated by laws. 
The Laws introduces much of the legislation for the new city, and also 
extensively discusses the nature and role of law in the life of the city, and 
the way in which the city's aim, the virtue of the citizens, is to be brought 
about by the laws. In the Republic it is the education of the rulers, the 
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 Plato's view in both works is, I hold, that virtue is sufficient for happiness, but by the standards of 
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necessary for happiness. 
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Guardians, which is the key to virtue, and so happiness, while in the later 
work law is prominent as the work of divine reason in the universe and 
in us. We are told that we should obey the immortal element in us as we 
order our homes and cities both publicly and privately, giving the name of 
law (nomos) to the distribution made by reason {nous).1 
It is important, of course, not to exaggerate the differences between the 
two works. The ideal state in the Republic is envisioned as an exercise in 
ideal lawmaking, and its provisions and practices are sometimes referred 
to as laws that have been established.4 The Guardians are sometimes said 
to be guardians of the laws that structure the ideal state.' Attention to 
legislation is said to be unnecessary, but only in matters of detail, in a con-
text where citizens obey the city's most important laws/ Still, a new idea 
is introduced into the Laws by the idea that the citizens' virtue, and thus 
happiness, is now to be sought through obedience to laws rather than to 
rulers. We can appreciate this if we reflect on the emphasis we find, in the 
Laws, on the idea of 'slavery to the laws'. 
The Laws not only accepts the contemporary institution of actual 
slavery as part of the ideal city, but treats the position of the slave more 
rigorously and harshly than contemporary practice. A master's communi-
cation to slaves, Plato holds, should be mostly one of command (epitaxis).s 
For that's just what the institution is: unquestioned authority on the one 
hand and unquestioning deference on the other. Given this, masters and 
slaves can never be friends.' Plato thinks that we should look this fact in 
the face unblinkingly. He is notably unworried by humanitarian consid-
erations about the slave; he worries only about masters ruining their own 
characters by abusing their authority or weakly evading it.1 
Given this emphasis on slavery as unquestioning deference to author-
ity, it is remarkable how prominently Plato uses slavery, in the Laws, as 
a metaphor for the correct human relation to laws. Law is a command 
(epitaxis), he says." He repeatedly says that Athenians of what he takes to 
be the exemplary generation of the Persian Wars were 'willing slaves' to 
3
 7i3e6—71432; cf. also 957C4—7 for the play on nous and nomos. 
4
 For example, 47ib9—10 — 'shall we establish this law?' (about conduct in war). 
s
 42ia5 (at 484b9-ci they are said to guard the laws). However, the term 'law guardian' {nomopbu-
lax) is new in the Laws. 
6
 425cio-426e4. Cf. Morrow (i960: 577-84). 
7
 Morrow (1939) shows that where Plato departs from contemporary Athenian practice it is nearly 
always in the direction of strengthening the institution and emphasising the distinction between 
slave and free. 
8
 777e6—778ai. ' 75731-5. Possibly a contrast is intended with Republic ^ocy-aj. 
'" 777C7-778a5. " 72335-
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their laws and rulers. This kind of slavery is one that should be undertaken 
by anyone wishing to be virtuous; only the coward is free and fearless. The 
threat of the Persian Wars, Plato says of the Athenians, 'made us serve an 
even greater slavery {douleian eti meizona ... douleusai) to the rulers and to 
the laws'.1 He is describing what he takes to have been an actual society, so 
he is not limiting the idea to an ideally rational population." 
In Magnesia, we are told, offices will be assigned to those notable for 
their obedience to law. 'We say that the highest service of the gods14 is to 
be given to the person who is first in being most readily obedient to the 
established laws, and wins this victory in the city ... I have called servants 
of the laws those referred to as rulers not for the sake of innovation; rather, 
I hold that the city's safety, and the reverse, depend on this most of all.''1 
And it's not just the rulers, the officials, in Magnesia who must have this 
attitude to the laws. We find that 'Every man should have this view about 
every person, that he who has not served as a slave could not become a 
praiseworthy master, and that we should take pride in16 serving finely as a 
slave rather than in ruling finely - first serving the laws, this being slavery 
to the gods, and then the young serving their elders and those who have 
lived notably.'1 Plato cannot fail to be aware of the shock-value of this 
metaphor as applied to free citizens of a state, who pride themselves on not 
being slaves to any person, and who own actual slaves, and are encouraged 
to maintain an attitude of authority over them. 
This attitude, of recognising law as having unconditional authority, is 
of great interest, and I shall return to it. It inevitably, however, prompts 
the question of how this can be the basis of a life of virtue, which is what 
the citizens are to lead in order to be happy. There are two sources of worry 
here, which Plato does not distinguish, though his emphasis seems to 
be on the first, namely, that the citizens' motivation for obeying the law 
12
 698b8—C2. In this passage, which stresses the freedom of the Athenians, slavery to the laws is 
mentioned repe3tedly 3nd emphatically: 69835-C3, 699ci-d2, 70033-5, 70ib5-c4. 
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would prominently be one of fear of the sanctions for breaking it. It would 
also seem that even people habituated to obeying the law might be doing 
so merely out of deferential routine. In either case, how can a developed 
disposition to live in obedience to the laws, one for which a leading meta­
phor is service and slavery, amount to the virtue of citizens? 
Plato certainly expects Magnesian citizens to be virtuous in a full, rich 
sense. For one thing, virtue is to be produced and sustained by an elabo­
rate and far-reaching system of formation and education of the citizens 
from birth (and even before birth) to the grave. It would be strange if this 
amounted to no more than the idea that 'the citizens can become virtuous 
if only their desires and passions are disciplined in such a way that they 
obey the law as a matter of habit', as one unsympathetic modern commen­
tator has put it. * 
Much in the Laws obviously fills the role of training the citizens to be 
virtuous; there is an entire system of physical, intellectual and aesthetic 
training whose goal is to produce citizens with good character. My ques­
tion here is how this concern for becoming virtuous and living a good life 
(and thus being happy) is related in Plato's thought to the idea that citizens 
not only live under a system of laws but regard themselves as having the 
deeply deferential attitude to it of slaves. 
Plato puts great emphasis on one aspect of his ideal legislation in the 
Laws, one whose originality he rightly stresses. The laws are to be pre­
ceded by prooimia, preambles or preludes (punning on the double sense 
of nomos as law and as musical composition).υ The preambles are intro­
duced as a means of persuasion, in addition to the force that lies behind 
any law which comes with sanctions. Previous lawgivers, he says, have 
failed to 'mix' persuasion with necessity in their lawgiving, but have used 
force unmixed. It is a feature of Magnesian life that the citizens expect 
to be persuaded that they should obey the law, instead of merely giving in 
to a threat; the youthful atheist in Book io feels entitled to this." When 
the idea of the preambles is introduced, in Book 4, it is illustrated by an 
example later repeated in Book 9, which contrasts the behaviour of free 
doctors treating free people, and their assistants, slaves who treat slaves. 
18
 Stalley (1983): 9. On p. 184 he talks of'Plato's conformist conception of virtue'. 
" 722d2-723d6. 
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 722b4—C2. I accept Ast's conjecture anagkèn in 722CI; whatever word is read there the passage 
clearly and repeatedly contrasts persuasion with force, bia. The MSS reading machen seems 
impossible; the Oxford text marks corruption, while England, though he reads it, thinks that it 
can only be defended if the containing phrase is read as a poetical quotation. 
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The latter just give instructions and hasten on to the next patient, while 
the free doctor listens to the patient's whole history of the problem, and 
not only tells him what to do but discusses the matter with him until the 
patient is himself convinced to take the necessary steps. 
We get numerous examples of preambles. Plato gives, as an explicit 
example, a preamble to the law requiring men to marry.2' There is a long 
preamble to the whole law code, 4 and we often find preambles to individ-
ual laws.2' There is a long discussion of the voluntary/involuntary distinc-
tion preceding the laws specifying penalties for different kinds of action,'6 
and most famously the bulk of Book io consists of a long argument for the 
three theses that the gods exist, that they exert providence for humans and 
that they cannot be deflected by human gifts, a passage preceding the laws 
against impiety.2" 
The preambles are a fascinating contribution to legal and political the-
ory, despite the point that Plato found no followers in this area.2S They raise 
a number of issues that I shall not be able to touch on. I shall be focusing 
on the single issue of how the preambles help us to grasp how citizens liv-
ing in a state where they are to give the laws unquestioned authority will 
become virtuous, rather than merely reliably rule-following. Since the pre-
ambles are emphatically aimed at persuading the citizens to be obedient to 
the laws, they have an obvious role in the citizens' attitude to the laws, and 
to the citizens' own self-definition as slaves to the laws. I will look at three 
suggestions about the preambles' role in forming the citizens' attitude to 
the laws, all of which have considerable merit but leave us with further 
problems. I shall then make my own suggestion, which involves looking 
at what I take to be a fruitful parallel. We find, I claim, that Plato's ideas 
are, regardless of the rather dogmatic way in which they are put forward 
in the Laws, suggestive in opening up our thoughts about Plato's political 
thought, as well as virtue and the forms that this can take. 
One thought is that what the preambles provide is rational explanation 
of the point of the law in question; the citizen is not just told what to do, 
22
 Jiyej—72oe9 — the slave doctors follow the epitaxis of their masters (72ob2), while the free doctor 
does not command (epetaxen) his patient until he persuades him (72od6-7); 857b9~e8. 
2
' 72133-72232. 24 72631-73465. 
25
 E.g., 853a3-854di on temple-robbing; 9i6di-9i7b7 on 3dulter3tion of items for S3le; 93033~932d7 
on C3re for psrents. 
26
 859b6-864C9. 
27
 89ob3-907d8. Cf. 88733-d. 
28
 Seneca, in letter 94.38, tells us that Posidonius found the Laws absurd in this regard, holding that 
3 k w should be brief 3nd memorable, 3nd tli3t the essence of k w is to command, not to te3ch. 
Seneca disagrees, but neither he nor 3nyone else took the Laws 3S 3 model. 
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but given an explanation which he can rationally scrutinise for justification 
as to why this is a good regulation, one operating for the citizens' benefit.29 
This is certainly an obvious message of the illustration contrasting the free 
and slave doctors, and it makes good sense of the second passage in which 
this occurs, in which the slave doctor is imagined as encountering a free 
doctor 'conversing with the patient and using arguments (or accounts, 
logoi) close to philosophising, starting from the source of the disease and 
mounting to the whole nature of bodies'. The slave doctor sneers that this is 
educating the patient rather than curing him, as though a patient wanted 
to become a doctor rather than to get well.,c This certainly suggests that 
the preambles are designed to enable the lawgivers to convey to the citizens 
their own articulate grasp of the good of having the law in question. And 
we can see how this would contribute to the citizens' becoming virtuous, 
for this will help to make them, as active reasoners, active participants in 
the rational ordering of the city, rather than passive conformers to the laws 
because of the threat of sanctions. 
Since, however, the citizens' rational grasp of the good aim of the laws 
has to be compatible with the attitude of deference that Plato emphatically 
calls slavery, we should not overplay the contrast here between the free and 
slave doctor. It would be unsafe to take Plato to be adumbrating the idea 
that free citizens are entitled to have laws presented for them to accept on 
the basis of their own reasonings. It is moreover striking that Plato takes 
persuasion to be 'mixed' with force; the alternatives he presents are the sin-
gle method of force and the double method of force 'mixed' with persua-
sion, never persuasion alone.32 Even for those capable of understanding it, 
rational persuasion alone does not provide an adequate basis for their atti-
tude to the laws. Further, many of the preambles are rather far from pro-
viding rational argument; the great preamble to the law code as a whole, in 
Book 5, has the earnest character of an address, but provides no argument, 
and some preambles even make use of mythical tales of terror.'' 
29
 This suggestion has recently been defended by Bobonich (2002). 
30
 857C7~e8. The Athenian's response to Cleini3s, where 3 connection is drawn between the doctor's 
procedure snd the spe3kers' t3sk, is problem3tic snd I13S been vsriously interpreted. I rake the 
Athenian to be saying that the critic is right (not to sneer but) to think that the doctor is educat-
ing his pstient, provided that he re3Üses that the procedure of the speakers in the Laws is indeed 
educating the citizens rather than legislating. Here 'legislating' must mean 'merely legislating 
without education', that is, using force alone without persuasion; this is because it is here cast in 
the role of the doctor's cure, which presupposes that something has already gone wrong. It need 
not imply that Plato standardly thinks of legislating as being an alternative to education. 
31
 See Bobonich (2002) for discussion of the citizens' entitlement as free and rational members of a 
community of equals very unlike the hierarchically ordered society of the Republic. 
32
 72oe2-9; 722b4-c2. 33 865d3-866ai, 87od4-87iai, 872C7—873b!. 
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Other considerations apart, however, how does the idea that the pre-
ambles give the citizens rational arguments for the laws help us to see how 
these citizens are developing and living virtuous lives? On the face of it, 
understanding the reasons for a law enables a citizen to see it as something 
she could give rational assent to, rather than as an alien imposition, some-
thing she can see no justification for but has to obey anyway. But there is 
a distance between this and the idea of the virtuous citizen as envisaged in 
the Laws, one whose every activity and enjoyment is in tune with those of 
the other citizens, whose life exhibits order and discipline even in singing 
and dancing. It is not clear how we get from rational argument and justi-
fication to the virtuous citizen's unforced enjoyment of living virtuously. 
This suggestion, then, needs supplementation. 
A second suggestion is that the preambles, far from offering rational 
argument, are rather supposed to work on the citizens in non-rational 
ways, making them docile and law-abiding by rhetorical means which 
manage and manipulate their susceptibility to praise and blame.'4 Some 
of the preludes do explicitly appeal to the force of non-rational myths — for 
example, that the soul of a murdered person will roam the earth seeking 
vengeance for the crime.15 Moreover, in some cases Plato stresses the way 
that the message will have to be embedded in a variety of more and less 
rational forms, as with the message that some forms of sex are unnatu-
ral: 'we shall tell them from childhood, in stories and sayings and singing 
in music, putting them, as is likely, under a spell'.36 
It is also a feature of the preambles that what they convey comes from 
experts to learners; the doctor is familiar from Plato's other works as the 
expert whose recommendations you should follow, and his being prepared 
to explain them to you doesn't take the edge off the fact that you still must 
do what he says. The Athenian gives an alternative: should we think of the 
written laws as being like loving and caring parents, or think of them as 
ordering and threatening, like a despotic tyrant, writing commands on the 
wall and then simply going away? '7 The first alternative is obviously more 
attractive than the second, but both involve authority being imposed. 
People are to be taught by those who know better, in ways adapted to their 
level of understanding, as children are taught by parents. This does not, 
of course, exclude rational argument where that is required, as with the 
34
 This is the view of Stalley (1983: 42-4). n See above, n. 33. 
>6 84ob9-c3; the verb here is kêlein. Compare the reference to epaidein (charm, enchant) in persuad-
ing people to obey the law, at 8i2b9—C7, 773d4—e4, 83765—6, 903310—b2. 
37
 85931-6. The Greek of 34-6 is confusing; I follow Engknd's constru3l, though it h3s the odd 
result th3t the kws are likened to a tyrant putting laws up on a wall. 
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young atheist in Book 10, but that will not be generally needed. On this 
view, the point of the preambles will simply be to make the citizen receive 
the law's command (epitaxis) more readily, and hence learn it better.'8 
The preambles, on this view, will dispose the citizens to have the kind of 
characters which are ready to obey the law because they have learned to do 
so from authoritative sources, ones which have presented it in ways which, 
relying on praise and blame, and prominently shame, have resulted in the 
law's being firmly internalised. These ways are appropriate to the citizens' 
ages and levels of intellectual achievement. And the sources are not merely 
authoritative, but also have independent claims on the citizens' attention 
because of the stability and benefits of the city life which are made possible 
by the laws and those administering them. This at any rate is one impli-
cation of the claim that the preambles present the laws as loving parents 
rather than arbitrary tyrants. 
Does this help us to see how living under a system of laws which you 
regard as having unquestioned authority could render you a virtuous citi-
zen? It is not yet clear how Plato could think that the aim of Magnesia's 
laws is the virtue, and so the happiness, of its citizens. The idea that the 
preambles are to render the citizens more docile and apt to accept the laws 
fits in with many aspects of the work— the importance of education, train-
ing and continuing vigilance in the way the citizens live, for example. But 
it falls short of what Plato requires for virtue, as we can see when we recall 
the passages where law, nomos, is connected with reason, nous. In obeying 
law, we have been told, we are obeying the immortal part of ourselves. If 
the citizens' attitude is simply one of obeying law unquestioningly because 
any impulses or tendencies to do or think otherwise have been neutral-
ised by the spell-binding effect of our upbringing, they appear passive and 
unthinking. A city, says the Athenian, won't be able to preserve its laws 
unless they are grasped with understanding and not merely by habit.3' 
And all citizens are to have an education, particularly in mathematics, 
which will enable them to grasp at least the rudiments of the workings of 
reason, in the cosmos and in the city. It would be strange if citizens had an 
education in the workings of reason, but grasped its workings in law only 
in the reduced sense of being rendered by their upbringing incapable of 
not deferring to it. 
38
 72334—b2, referring specific3lly to the preambles. The learning comes through the docility of the 
3ccept3nce, not the other way round. 
39
 95ia7-b4; the context is the need to keep awsre of wh3t those outside the city, good 3nd bsd, 3re 
doing. Mere habituation will leave the citizens unprepared for new challenges. 
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Clearly, the preambles have the role of helping to make the citizens' 
relation to the laws a richer one than that of being disposed to obey them 
out of deference or fear of sanctions. They do this by 'persuading', and 
Plato explicates this by appeal both to rational explanation and to non-
rational aspects of the citizens' upbringing which rely on praise and blame 
to mould their attitudes. We can see how in both kinds of case the citizens' 
disposition to obey the laws would be reinforced. Some kinds of upbring-
ing, especially those using shame, make some kinds of action repulsive, or 
even unthinkable to people; and rational understanding makes people able 
to withstand intellectual assaults on their positions. But Plato insists that 
his is a 'double' approach; obedience to the law and fear of its penalties is 
never replaced, only reinforced. So far we have just found factors dispos-
ing people to obey the law readily and firmly, as well as out of deference to 
its authority. This suggestion also needs supplementation: we haven't yet 
found anything explaining how these law-abiding citizens are to be virtu-
ous, to have good character. 
Part of the answer here is, I think, to be found in a third suggestion, 
which stresses the way that Plato claims that those persuaded by the pre-
ambles would not need law at all. Magnesia is to be a state where all the 
citizens get a thorough ethical education, and in such a state the need for 
law with its penalties at all represents a kind of failure. It is, the Athenian 
says, in a way shameful to be legislating for a city which is to be well run 
and well equipped for virtue. ' It has, then, been suggested ' that the pre-
ambles give us an ideal, while the need for law represents a concession to 
the greed and competitiveness of our actual human nature. In the ideal 
state of affairs of the preambles, law would not be needed because the citi-
zens would have proper understanding of what the preambles direct them 
towards; real life, however, requires laws and the less ideal motivation of 
those obeying them. 
It is an objection to this suggestion that in the Laws the preambles are 
represented as an essential part of the same project as the laws - the 'dou-
ble' project of making people be persuaded as well as obeying the law.42 
4
° 853b3-c3. 
41
 This position is defended by Laks (1990,1991, 2000). I do not agree with Laks' claim that 85763-5 
shows that for Plato the lawgiver's task is to educate rather than to legislate; the passage is a vexed 
one, open to different interpretations (see above, n. 28). There are, however, many passages where 
Plato sees the need for law as an unfortunate fallback — for example, where citizens educated in 
Magnesia receive different penalties from those of foreigners and slaves who lacked the benefit of 
this education (e.g., 854dl—e6). 
42
 7i8b2-5, 72oe2~5. Other objections to Laks' view can be found in Bobonich (2002: 109-11, 
506—8). Here I am concerned simply with the point about virtue. 
8ο J U L I A A N N A S 
None the less, there is something right in the idea that the preambles put 
forward an ideal, while laws are there to correct actual defective behav­
iour. What we need is to find a role for the preambles that does justice to 
the point that they present an ideal, and shows how they can function to 
help people who obey the laws to become virtuous. If we cannot do this, 
we should note, we lack an adequate account of their role in the work, as 
well as an adequate account of how following laws will render the citizens 
virtuous. The account of such a role should also show why we cannot do 
justice to them by a focus on rational understanding alone or irrational 
habituation alone. 
Here we can, I think, be pointed in the right direction by looking at 
another ancient author presenting a system of law as a context in which 
people learn to be virtuous and so happy. This is Philo of Alexandria, 
the Jewish philosopher and commentator on Scripture, who in a series of 
works on the Decalogue, the Special Laws and the Virtues presents the 
demands of Mosaic law in a way which shows how those who follow them 
with the right kind of understanding develop the virtues of piety, wisdom, 
temperance, courage and humanity4 3 
Philo is interpreting the Torah, which he takes to be the work of Moses 
as lawgiver. Moses, he says, differed from lawgivers who simply lay down 
what is and is not to be done, for he thought that to command {prostat-
tein) without encouragement (paramuthia) is the way to treat slaves rather 
than free men. 'In his commands and prohibitions he suggests and advises 
for the most part rather than giving orders, trying to give guidance on the 
large number of necessary points by means of preambles (prooimia) and 
after-words, for the sake of exhorting (protrepsasthai) rather than forcing.'44 
Philo's own procedure can also reasonably be seen as aiming to show how 
the system of Mosaic law is not just a set of rules to obey but structures a 
way of life which can be positively and persuasively recommended. 
The Laws is obviously, from the above passage, among Philo's 
influences, " and despite their obvious differences of aim Plato and Philo 
43
 On the Decalogue, On the Special Laws, On the Virtues. (I take no stand on the issue of whether the 
following sections, on repentance and on good birth, should be placed at this point or not.) 
4 4
 Life of Moses U 51 (cf. all of 48-51). 
45
 The influence of the Laws is quite widespread in Philo's writings. He borrows memorable phrases, 
though often using them with his own twist. For example, he uses the Laws' notorious image of 
humans as puppets (Laws 64^άγ—645C6, 80434—b8), putting it into a Stoic context where it is the 
ruling part or hégemonikon which pulls the strings to move the other parts (Op. IIJ, Abraham 73, 
Fug. 46, QG III 48). The phrase about blind wealth at Laws 631C4—5 is used at Special Laws I 25 
and elsewhere, adapted to the contexts. Other examples, gathered in the index to volume 10 of the 
Loeb edition of Philo, show similar changes and rwists. 
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share some important concerns.*6 They are both interpreting a system of 
laws which, being divine in origin, is not to be changed by any human 
political process (though it may need ongoing interpretation).4" They both 
see these laws as aimed at making the community virtuous — in both cases, 
virtuous in a way in which piety, and the proper attitude to the divine, is 
dominant. Moreover, they both see living virtuously as being necessary 
for members of the community to live a happy, flourishing life.,s I sug-
gest, then, that paying attention to some general features of what Philo is 
doing may point us in the right direction as we try to answer the question 
of the role of the Laws' preambles in helping to make virtuous people out 
of Magnesian citizens who think of themselves as slaves to the laws. I am 
not suggesting that we can argue from specific features of what Philo does 
to interpret Plato; for one thing, their tasks are quite different.,; Philo is 
interpreting the Torah, and Plato is sketching an ideal state (a project of 
which Philo is quite critical).'0 
Two things are noteworthy about Philo's procedure. One is that it does 
not occur to him that laws and rules might be ethically self-standing, that 
what is ethically basic might be simply the peculiar force of rules. Living 
according to Mosaic law, he holds, produces a virtuous character, and he 
does not by this mean the mere disposition reliably to follow rules. The 
character he has in mind is described as one in which reasoning, feeling 
and decision are harmoniously integrated: 
For each of the ten pronouncements individually and all together prepare and 
exhort us {protrepousi) to practical wisdom {phronêsis) and justice and piety and 
the rest of the chorus of virtues. They make our words (logoi) healthy with good 
deliberations, and attach good actions to our words, so that the soul's instrument 
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 I am not a Philo scholar, and cannot address rhe issue of Philo's inrended audience for these 
works. I have been much helped by the work of David Runia, Gregory Sterling, Hava Tirosh-
Samuelson and especially Hindy Najman. 
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 See Life of Moses II12—16. See Najman (2003) and Sterling (2003). Philo's views about divine law 
are influenced by the Stoics, and my claims about similarities between these specific projects of 
Philo and Plato do not rest on any larger claims about Philo's being a Platonist. I take him not to 
be committed to any of the pagan philosophical schools, but rather to use their work as material 
for his own interpretative task. See Mansfeld (1988). 
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 That Philo should be read in a eudaimonistic framework, and further that this is part of an ongo-
ing Jewish tradition rather than an alien import from pagan philosophy, is argued in Tirosh-
Samuelson (2003). 
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 From Aristobulus on (Fragment 3a Supplement in Holkday 1995), Jewish writers in the ancient 
world see Plato as influenced by Mosaic law, and thus see the Laws as an inferior, pagan version of 
a truth that the Jewish tradition has in a sounder form. 
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 Life of Moses II 49—52: it is more appropriare ro set lawgiving in a cosmic framework than in that 
of an invented city. Philo seems to think that the latter compromises the lawgiver's task from the 
start. He ignores the Laws' own cosmic framework. 
8 2 J U L I A A N N A S 
may throughout play in tune to produce concord of life and an unassailable 
harmony.'1 
Secondly, he does not treat the Ten Commandments as a list of isolated 
rules. Rather, he treats them as 'generic' rules which 'summarise' the spe­
cific ones, while the latter 'tend towards' the ten major ones.52 The Sixth 
Commandment, 'You shall not commit adultery', for example, is not 
treated as an isolated prohibition of one kind of action. Rather, it is treated 
as the 'heading' round which are grouped a whole cluster of diverse posi­
tive and negative rules and practices unified by concern with the proper 
management of sexual desire. Thus we find prohibition not only of adul­
tery but of incest, homosexuality, bestiality, rape and seduction, as well as 
rules regulating sex within marriage. Practices and rules covering different 
areas of life are unified by their reference to the aim of properly controlling 
and conducting sexual desire, which is taken to be universally strong and 
liable to transgress boundaries.53 
In this way a variety of rules and the way these structure social prac­
tices are grouped in ways that relate them to an ethically salient aim. In 
keeping with the fact that Philo finds the control οι pathos, passion or 
feeling, to be an important part of what many rules are for, we find that 
the Tenth Commandment, which Philo reads as 'You shall not desire',' * is 
treated as the heading under which are brought rules to regulate desire. 
Nothing, Philo claims, is more troublesome than desire, the urge to get 
what we don't have; it leads us to think things good which are not, and so 
to disturb our values. Desire leads the irrational part of the soul to get the 
person to take various irrational and disastrous courses, and to mistaken 
evaluations of what in life is important. This happens in all areas of our 
life; desire for money, for example, turns people dishonest, desire for fame 
turns them unreliable and desire for power turns them unscrupulous. It is 
important, therefore, to discipline from the start the most basic form of 
desire, which will help to render its other forms more amenable. Hence 
the basic desires for food and drink are from the start to be regulated and 
31
 Special Laws IV134. Philo appeals to the idea of virtue as a disposition not merely to act in certain 
ways, but to do so for certain reasons, and to have one's feelings and emotions in harmony with 
this. 
32
 Special Laws II 189: the Ten Commandments are genikoi nomoi, while the particular rules of 
Mosaic k w are ta en eidei; III 7: ta en merei are said to sunteinein to the ten. 
53
 Special Laws III 8-82. 
34
 Special Laws IV 79-131. The discussion of desire is prominent in the treatment of the Tenth 
Commandment in Lhe Decalogue 142—53. Philo is reading this commandment, in the Septuagint 
translation, as prohibiting epithumein, and takes it to concern desire as a fundamental and poten­
tially disastrous aspect of human psychology. 
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trained by the dietary laws, which bring it about that even basic eating and 
drinking take place in a disciplined and discriminating framework. When 
hungry, members of the Jewish community will not just gratify desire, but 
will always think in terms of what foods are permitted and forbidden, and 
which ways food can and cannot be prepared. Thus desire for food will 
be trained to seek only orderly and discriminating gratification, and will 
come to take an orderly and discriminating form. This lays the foundation 
for a well-regulated character in a number of other areas where different 
kinds of desire are in question." The overall aim of managing desire as the 
basis of well-regulated character thus leads to what might seem at first like 
the unobvious bringing of the Jewish dietary rules under the heading of 
the Tenth Commandment. 
Similarly, Philo's treatment of the Fourth Commandment, to honour 
the Sabbath, treats the seventh day as only one of all the Jewish festivals, 
grouping them by the idea of right observance of a festival, something that 
requires the right frame of mind and not just the performance of ritual. He 
gives the different details of the festivals, all of which are to be scrupulously 
observed, focusing on the different ways in which these celebrations bring 
the members of the community to understand their relationship with God 
and with one another. If only we were not dominated by the vices, 'but 
the powers of the virtues had remained unconquered in any way, our time 
from birth to death would have been one continual festival, and families 
and cities, in peace and freedom from fear, would have been filled with 
good things in tranquility'.56 For properly understood, keeping a festival is 
not having a good time but 'finding delight and festivity in the contempla-
tion of the cosmos and what is in it, and in following nature and in har-
mony of words with actions and actions with words'.'" (This idea, that the 
true meaning of a religious festival is to be found in the joys of virtuous 
living, is reminiscent of the passages in the Laws where the Athenian says 
that a citizen's life is properly to be thought of as one of ritual singing and 
dancing, these being proper forms of play (e.g., 8o3d2-ci — a passage end-
ing with a sharp reminder of humans' littleness in relation to God).) 
Just from these three examples (more could be given) we can see that 
what is stressed is the ethical point of a given practice or following a given 
rule. This ethical aim is not obvious if we merely think of the rules in an 
isolated way, but a grasp of it can change the spirit in which the rules are 
35
 The giving of first fruits is also important in this discipline (Special Laws IV 98—9.) Philo has many, 
mostly symbolic, explanations of why the dietary laws take the particular form that they do. 
0
 Special Laws II 42. 37 Special Laws II52. 
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followed. Obeying the Jewish dietary laws can be an exercise of temper-
ance, not just rule-following, if done in relation to the aim of disciplining 
desire as the basis of good character. Avoiding adultery can be an exercise 
of virtue, not just obedience to rules, if done in relation to the aim of liv-
ing in a manner in which sexual desire is from the start treated as more 
than mere gratification of desire, and is seen in a framework of marriage 
and its responsibilities. 
The rules, then, are to be obeyed, but obedience to them is embedded 
in practices which structure what we can see to be agoodway of life. Rules 
require obedience but also enable us to aspire to an ideal in the way we 
live, trying to improve our characters rather than merely conforming to 
what is demanded. Keeping the dietary laws, for example, can be seen as 
a way of developing, and living in accordance with, a disciplined set of 
appetites. Understanding this enables the following of the rules to become 
not merely a habit, but first a learning and then an exercise of temperance, 
and ultimately part of the development of a steady and self-disciplined 
character. 
Philo, as I suggested, can point us in the right direction when we are 
thinking about the role of the preambles in the Laws. What his project 
suggests is the idea of presenting a system of laws supplemented neither 
by purely intellectual argument for their foundations, nor by merely rhe-
torical ways of inducing acceptance, but rather by a presentation of ethi-
cal aims - aims to be pursued not as an alternative to but rather in living 
in a way structured by these laws and rules. Such a presentation gets 
across the ideals of character to be achieved by the person who follows 
the rules, and such a person comes to see their education, and, when 
adult, their whole lives, as a constant exercise of self-improvement. 
If we approach the preambles of the Laws with this in mind, we can 
see that they give us an ideal which is not an alternative to following laws. 
The laws, by commanding and prohibiting actions in various areas of 
life - birth, marriage, farming, political interaction - structure the citi-
zens' activities and practices in those areas. The preambles set out for the 
citizens ideals of living that they are to achieve in following the laws. As 
they come to see obedience to laws in the light of ethical aims, they appre-
ciate that following the laws is the way to become temperate, disciplined 
and thus better people.'8 The citizens thus come to aspire to an ideal in 
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 Temperance, self-discipline and lack of self-assertion are srrongly emphasised in the Laws; the 
Republic's focus on justice is replaced by an emphasis on sôpbrosunê as the citizen virtue (though 
even in the Laws itself it continues to be seen as a characreristically female rather than male virtue). 
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doing what they do, and see their actions as aimed at a good beyond that 
of merely following the rules.59 They come to see that they have reasons for 
doing what they do, reasons referring to the good achieved for them and 
for society in their following these rules and engaging in the practices they 
structure. Further, if guided by the right kind of education, they come to 
internalise this understanding in a way that is harmonious with their feel-
ings and emotions. They come to follow the laws in a way which expresses 
virtue. 
Take, for example, the Laws' very first preamble, put forward as an 
example.6 Men are to marry between the ages of thirty and thirty-five; 
otherwise they are to be penalised by fines and loss of status. They are also 
to be persuaded by a preamble, which briefly develops the idea that it is 
natural for a human being to look further than the span of his own6 bio-
logical life, and to aim at a kind of immortality, as is shown by the desire 
for posthumous fame. It is not 'pious' (hosion), the preamble claims, to 
break the link of generation which keeps humans going on without end, 
for this shows lack of understanding of a crucial fact about humans: the 
way in which individual humans look beyond their own lives and see 
themselves as part of a continuous linked family. 
This is not a piece of argument, or in any obvious way a rhetorical 
'spell'. It is a discursive attempt to give individual humans a correct, 
rather than a misguided, understanding of what it is to be human, one to 
be understood, as the context stresses,6 in tandem with the law and its 
penalties. 
Without the understanding provided by the preamble, someone might 
get married as a possibly disagreeable obligation. With it, he is more likely 
to think of getting married in an unforced way, as something he does with-
out prompting at a certain stage of life because it is part of what he under-
stands as living well. He will find getting married attractive, and will see 
his life as improved by his change in status, because he is aware of it as part 
of what humans do in a good society where the generations are linked.6'3 
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 The latter will always be important, however, for the city's stability. 6o 72ib6-d6. 
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 Despite the Laws' (somewhat unclear) commitment to including women in the citizen body, it is 
definitely men who are in mind here. The passage is bound to remind us of Symposium 207c—208e 
(though without the contrast with the higher-minded who seek immortality through non-physical 
means). 
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 The Athenian goes on to stress the benefits of using both methods, persuasion and force, not 
merely one (722ei—723b2). 
63
 The importance of family, of respecting elders and of maintaining family continuity, is a very 
strong theme in the Laws. 
86 J U L I A A N N A S 
He will see someone who fails to marry as not just a lawbreaker but as self-
ish, lacking appreciation for what makes a citizen's life a good one. He will 
develop the appropriate disposition, one which will be expressed in con-
texts other than marriage, and will concern family life as a whole. Given 
that this disposition does in fact lead to humans living the best life for 
them (something which Plato assumes without arguing for it in the Laws), 
this is one way in which he will develop the virtues. Following this law in 
the right way can be, for someone with the appropriate understanding, 
part of living virtuously and thus happily. 
The great preamble in Book 5 to the laws as a whole is also neither 
rational argument nor rhetorical 'spell'. It has sometimes been character-
ised as a sermon, and this is (for us) not entirely inappropriate. It makes 
the claim that a human should, after honouring the gods, honour his soul 
before his body and possessions; this is the attitude that should direct 
treatment of family, friends, fellow-citizens and strangers. Honouring the 
soul is explicated in terms of making virtue one's overall aim, and this 
notion of virtue is then spelled out further in terms of combining what 
is good in spiritedness and gentleness, and avoiding selfishness and self-
assertion. Moreover, the preamble ends, a life in which these are the pri-
orities is in fact the most pleasant, and therefore the one that everybody 
really aims for. 
A citizen of Magnesia who took this preamble to heart would thereby 
have learnt that in obeying the laws he was not just avoiding penalties, 
but rather coming to live a good life, one in which he was being educated 
to have the right aims and ideals. This cannot be adequately seen as sim-
ply being given rational justification, or simply being 'magicked' into 
obeying the laws. Rather, he has come to see himself as having an aim, 
in living according to the laws, which he accepts in his life as a whole, in 
both rational and non-rational aspects. And so he realises that in living 
according to the laws he is not just staying out of trouble, but is coming to 
have good values, and is becoming someone to whom living virtuously is 
unforcedly pleasant. 
This is, in an obvious way, a more positive attitude to obeying Magnesian 
laws than he would have had without the preamble. A citizen seeing the 
preamble as giving him a positive ideal to work towards would see the 
laws, and obedience to them, not just as a way of keeping stable order in 
the state but as a positive help towards rendering himself and all the citi-
zens virtuous. Magnesian citizens thus do not merely avoid breaking the 
law; they have a positive attitude to it and to its being obeyed, by them-
selves and by others. One aspect of this which Plato stresses is that part of 
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being a good citizen in Magnesia involves not just obeying the law oneself 
but intervening and informing on lawbreaking by others.64 
This account of the role of the preambles makes it easy to see why Plato 
lays stress on the importance of contexts for praise and blame which don't 
fall under law proper, and why he puts great emphasis on informal regu-
lation and social sanction. It is not practicable for laws to regulate every 
detail of family life, yet it is important for citizens' lives overall to reflect 
correct values if the laws are not to be destabilised. Plato relies on the 
thought that citizens educated in his state will appreciate the values that 
are fostered by obeying the laws, and thus will come to praise and blame 
behaviour in ways that will, as we say, informally 'police' it, before it gets 
to the stage of needing law and hence punishment to be imposed.6' 
This fits well with the idea that obeying the laws should properly be 
done in awareness not only of their demands but also of the ideals that 
obeying them will enable citizens to achieve. We obey the demands of 
divine reason not only by habitually conforming to the laws but by coming 
to understand them. Since we obey them in the everyday contexts of our 
social practices, we come to have proper understanding of them by coming 
to appreciate how following them is part of a good way of life. Coming to 
understand this will in turn enable citizens to draw the right distinctions, 
and praise and blame the right things, in daily life. The informal system 
of praise, blame and other informal sanctions thus produced supports the 
actual laws in two ways. It enables the citizens' law-abidingness to become 
a self-maintaining system, where education can ideally obviate the need 
for the threat of penalties. And it produces individuals who follow the laws 
and organise their lives in self-directed ways. It is not through fear of pen-
alties that Magnesia's citizens leap from their beds every day before dawn 
and get moving before the servants do.66 
Citizens, then, are obliged to obey the laws — not just those enforceable in 
court but the 'unwritten laws' and practices of Magnesia which are enforced 
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 While doing no wrong is honourable (timios), the person who does not let others get away with 
wrongdoing is twice as worthy, since in informing to the magistrates he 'counts as' many rather 
than just one. Still more commendable is the person who assisrs the state officials in punishing 
wrongdoing (73od2~7). Sometimes legislation includes penalties for those who fail to inform on 
wrongdoing (e.g., 8o8e7-8o9a3). 
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 793a9—d5, Szxdi—Si^ô. Philo makes a similar point: 'Habits (ethe) are unwritten laws, the resolu-
tions (dogmata) of men of old, engraved not on monuments or on papyrus, which gets eaten up by 
moths, but on the souls of people who share in the same constitution' (Special Laws IV 149—50). 
People should inherit these from their parents, and not despise them because they are not written 
down. Cf. On the Virtues 65. 
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 8o6d7-8o8c6. Sleeping and waking appropriately is, obviously, a habit that cannot be com-
manded by law but must spring from a self-directed ordering of one's life. 
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by community praise and blame. Educating themselves to follow these laws, 
however, eventually renders them virtuous, because the laws structure prac-
tices that enable and encourage ideals that citizens can follow in order to live 
the good, and so happy, life. Hence it is not the most 'complete' praise of a 
citizen for virtue to say that he best serves the laws and is most obedient to 
them; more complete praise is that he passes his life throughout obeying the 
lawgiver's words not only of law but also of praise and blame.6 
This suggestion about the role of the preambles puts into context what is 
right about the previous suggestions. The preambles do present an ideal — 
but one which is to be achieved in following the laws, not as an alterna-
tive to them, though it is correct that for well-educated citizens the laws' 
sanctions should always be a back-up and not foremost in their minds. 
We can also see that preambles will use both rational argument and non-
rational rhetorical devices, and which will be used, or will preponderate, 
will depend on the topic. Citizens who have once got the idea of atheism 
need to be met with argument, since a rational challenge to tradition has 
to be met on its own ground; and we need argument to sort out the place 
of voluntariness in the legal code. But sometimes, as when dealing with 
unruly forces like sexual desire or homicidal rage, irrational means are a 
more effective way of getting across the point of a regulation. 
I have tried to show how the preambles in the Laws play an important 
role in showing how a society whose citizens' lives are organised by a sys-
tem of laws can also be seen as a society whose aim is the virtue (and hence 
happiness) of the citizens, without any weakening of the notion of virtue. 
As Plato stresses, the lawgiver's task is always the double one of persuading 
as well as forbidding, since his aim is a society of virtuous people. Plato 
encourages us to see the preambles in this light, given his stress on them 
as well as on the formal and informal education of the citizens from the 
cradle to the grave. But how does this fit with the sharp insistence, which 
I earlier highlighted, on the citizens and their rulers as 'slaves of the laws'? 
Plato goes out of his way to make us notice his harsh metaphor character-
ising free citizens as slaves to the laws. How does this fit with his picture of 
obeying the law as leading to virtue if done in pursuit of the ideals given 
by understanding of the laws' aims? 
For Plato in the Laws, as we have seen, actual slavery embodies the idea 
of deference to unquestioned authority. In seeing ourselves as slaves to the 
67
 822e4—823ai; here the preambles as well as the laws proper are referred ro as rhe lawgiver's 'writ-
ing'. The lawgiver must write down what things seem to him fine and not fine 'interwoven' (empe-
plegmena) with the laws (82332—5). 
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laws, we are to see ourselves as obeying their requirements without ques-
tion. What is ethically basic is seen as a matter of demand. One of the 
most interesting aspects of the Laws is that Plato uses the highly charged 
metaphor of slavery to claim that this should be our relationship to laws. 
The laws, like masters, give us orders and commands (epitaxis) and we 
have to do what they say; that is just what the relationship is. 
Plato does not of course think that we should have this relationship to 
any actual laws, any more than to any actual rulers; we should have it only 
to laws of an ideally planned and governed society We should have it to 
laws which aim at our good, so that in following them we live virtuous 
and so happy lives. Thus the authority we defer to is expert understanding 
of our good, which we ourselves lack. In the Republic it was the Guardians 
who had this expert knowledge; in the Laws it is embodied in the laws. 
Plato does two things which are new. One is to sharpen our understand-
ing of obedience by means of the metaphor of slavery to the laws. The 
other is to pair this with the idea that we can, through the persuasion of 
the preambles, grasp the ideals to be achieved in following the laws, so that 
we become virtuous in so doing. Virtue is thus unified with the notion of 
obligation in a way which is distinctive. It is a commonplace that ancient 
social and political thought focuses its reflective attention on the notions 
of good and virtue rather than the deontic notions of rules and obligations. 
In the Laws Plato synthesises these two kinds of notion to produce a result 
which is far more similar to Philo's interpretation of the Law than it is to 
the thought of Aristotle's Politics, and which finds no substantive echo in 
pagan ethical and social thought generally. 
The plausibility of this relation between law and virtue rests, of course, 
on Plato's grounds for thinking that the laws he discusses will in fact be the 
basis for the good and happy life. Plato himself makes the claim that law 
is not just reason but divine reason; those who use their minds and think 
rationally will come to understand the way that the cosmos as a whole, 
and human society in particular, is rationally organised by the divine. The 
way law thus comes from God makes it reasonable to see Plato's Magnesia 
as a theocracy,68 and we should thus not be surprised to find analogies with 
Philo, although they differ in ways corresponding to the ways that their 
theologies differ. For Plato theology is a matter of rational understanding, 
based on mathematics and astronomy; for Philo it centrally focuses on 
interpretation of a sacred text. Still, Plato says many things in this text that 
became congenial to the later Judaeo-Christian tradition: God, not man, 
The actual word theokratia first occurs much larer (Josephus, Against Apion II165) 
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is the measure of all things;6' self-love is the root of most evils;70 we should 
be humble before God, not self-assertive,' and think of human matters as 
utterly insignificant in relation to God. ? 
As I said earlier, Plato's ideas in the Laws are, despite the dogmatic 
tone, often suggestive in opening up the way we think, particularly about 
ancient ethical and political thought. I will end by suggesting two ways in 
which this seems to me to be the case. 
Recent discussion of the Laws has emphasised ways in which it antici­
pates Aristotle in taking political society to be a community of free and 
equal individuals taking turns ruling and being ruled,n aiming at the 
common good. In such a society the individual is recognised as having a 
status missing in the hierarchical structure of the Republic. There are ele­
ments in the Laws which bring this out, but there are also the strong analo­
gies I have stressed here to explicitly theocratic societies, where the ethical 
framework of the community is found in demands from a divine source, 
demands which have the force of obligations, and which, because their 
source is divine, can't be changed by mere human agreement (though they 
will need ongoing interpretation).'4 The Laws gives us an interesting com­
bination of theocracy with the more familiar picture in ancient political 
thought of society's aim being the virtue and so happiness of the citizens. 
The unfamiliarity of this combination indicates dangers in seeing Plato's 
political ideas in terms of our own. This is a tendency which has produced 
particularly toxic results for the Republic but which is problematic with 
any ancient text. Rather than trying to locate the Laws in any one tradi­
tion of political thought, I think it is probably more fruitful for us to study 
the ways in which it can combine ideas which for us belong in different 
traditions. 
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 Ji$ej-ji6d4, esp. 716C4-6. 7° 73id6-732b5. 
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 71567-71634: the person hoping to be happy should be humble (tapeinos) in following God; the 
self-assertive person is doomed to unhappiness. Elsewhere tapeinos is an unfavourable term, and 
even in the Laws it appe3rs 3S 3n undesirable extreme of spiritlessness snd grovelling (728di-5, 
791Ί5-9)· 
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 The passage 803C2—804CI is remarkable for its insistence that humans are altogether insignificant 
in relation to God; even Megillus is shocked by this idea. 
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 643e3-6. 
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 The Laws contains both the view that a successfully created society should be self-sustaining and 
complete (96ob5—ci), and the recognition of the need for an analogue of the painter who can 
continue to improve his creation and teach others to do so (769b6-77ia4). (The fact that ten years 
is set as the limit for improving the regulations about sacrifices and dances at 77234—d4 should 
not encourage us to think of total stasis for the whole law system.) Cf. 95ia4-c4, where the city, 
to preserve its laws, has to grasp them with undersranding and not just habit; this is a reason for 
seeking useful information from foreign travel. Some kind of ongoing adjustment seems to be the 
province of the Nocturnal Council. 
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The other way in which the Laws can perhaps open up or extend our 
philosophical discussions concerns virtue. It is a familiar fact that the last 
two decades have seen a huge revival of interest in virtue ethics, much of it 
focusing on naturalistic virtue ethics of an Aristotelian kind, in which the 
virtues are rooted in human nature. Much of the impetus for the revival 
of virtue ethics is rightly given to Elizabeth Anscombe's article 'Modern 
Moral Philosophy', in which she does indeed make some statements which 
have been influential in the modern revival of neo-Aristotelian virtue eth-
ics. But it has been less noticed that Anscombe herself makes the follow-
ing striking statement: 'To have a law conception of ethics is to hold that 
what is needed for conformity with the virtues failure in which is the mark 
of being bad qua man ... - that what is needed for this, is required by 
divine law.'"' 
The modern development of Anscombe's ideas has focused on neo-
Aristotelian virtue ethics, which think of the virtues in the context of 
human nature and are congenial to modern naturalism and secularism. 
The idea of virtue as developed within a framework of divine law has not 
had similarly extensive contemporary examination. Perhaps some of this 
neglect has been due to the assumption that within such a framework all 
that virtue could amount to would be reliable rule-following, perhaps 
motivated by fear of sanctions. The Laws is one of the works that can ena-
ble us to see the limitations of this line of thought. For, despite the new 
kind of emphasis on law, one thing Plato does not do is to thin out his 
citizens' disposition to obey the laws, making it mindless, merely habitual 
or motivated by avoidance of sanctions. He is not satisfied to make it any-
thing less than virtue. For we all want happiness; and only virtue can lead 
to happiness. 
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 Anscombe (1997:31). She adds, 'Naturally it is not possible to have such a conception unless you 
believe in God as a lawgiver; like Jews, Stoics and Chrisrians.' (I think it is reasonable ro include 
the Plato of the Laws in this group.) See the articles by Roger Crisp, Sabina Lovibond and Onora 
O'Neill in O'Hear (2004). 
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